# A Decade-Long Economic Crisis: Cyprus vs. Greece

#### **Gikas Hardouvelis**

Professor of Finance & Economics University of Piraeus


Limassol, Cyprus, November 18, 2016

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
### A Decade-Long Economic Crisis: Cyprus vs. Greece

- A different economic trajectory and future prospects
- II. Why?
  - 1) Differences prior to the rescue package
  - 2) Different policy responses after the rescue
- III. Common risks today
- IV. Concluding remarks on Cyprus

#### I. A very different economic trajectory: Small loss in Cyprus, huge loss in Greece




#### I. A very different economic trajectory: Unemployment back to its pre-crisis level in Cyprus



#### A very different economic trajectory: Country risk is lower in Cyprus



# A very different economic trajectory: Optimism in Cyprus, decoupling in Greece



#### Hence ... different policy targets today

#### <u>CYPRUS</u>

- Escaped the crisis without losing its international competitive advantages
- Can afford to focus on its long-term growth path
- Major long-term risks: high NPLs, low investment

#### **GREECE**


- ☐ Still in recession, in a 3<sup>rd</sup> Program, no ownership of reforms, excluded from QE, unable to access financial markets
- Needs to target a cyclical recovery
- ☐ For the Long-term:
  - Public debt is unsustainable since 2015
  - A new policy of Over-Taxation since 2015 constrains long-term growth
  - Has no plan for long-term growth, no credibility and appears hostile to FDI
- Major long-term risks: high NPLs, low investment

## II. WHY? Differences prior to the rescue package Comparison across the Euro Area

Market failure:
Markets ignored the differences between countries and lent easily to both private & public

sector

- ☐ Two major imbalances, fiscal & external competitiveness
- ☐ Greece was an outlier in the Euro Area, carrying twice the imbalances of Cyprus



☐ Other imbalances: Private sector credit. Cyprus has a problem, Greece no

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#### II. Differences just prior to the rescue package

Initial Conditions	Greece	Cyprus
	(April-May2010)	(March 2013)
	or 2009)	or 2012)
Primary Balance (% GDP)	-10.3%	<b>-2.9</b> %
General Gov. Balance (% GDP)	<i>-</i> 15.2%	<b>-5.8</b> %
Gross Public Debt (% GDP)	<b>127</b> %	79%
Current Account Balance (% GDP)	-12.3%	<b>-6.0</b> %
<b>Doing Business</b> Distance to Frontier (best = 100)	62.4 (2010)	69.1
REER (ULC total economy deflated,	123	110
1999Q1 = 100)	(2010Q1)	(2013Q1)
Private Sector Debt (% GDP)	117%	328%
Banks Assets (% of GDP)	213%	750%

- 1) Differences in Fiscal statistics: Greece in worse position
- 2) Differences in Competitiveness statistics: Greece in worse position
- 3) Differences in Financial sector statistics: Cyprus in worse position

#### II. More Differences prior to the rescue package

#### 4) Crisis arrived in Cyprus 2 to 3 years after it arrived in Greece

- a) Later crisis-outbreak made Cyprus worse-off because
  - European economy was growing in 2012-13
  - in 2012-13 Europe had developed defense mechanisms (ESM, Banking Union, etc) and was not worried about contagion
- b) Later crisis-outbreak made Cyprus better off because
  - Cyprus had the benefit of hindsight, observing earlier crisis-hit countries: Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and even Spain


#### 5) Speed in concluding the negotiations

- Greece concluded the details of the MOU and signed in a month
- Cyprus applied in June 2012 and signed in March 2013
- 6) Different government relations with the central bank
- 7) Different types of political parties in power


#### II. Differences in policy responses

- Lenders' policy response: Harsh on Cyprus, lenient on Greece
  - **❖** In Cyprus, a Bail-In with immediate capital controls
    - loss of wealth, yet primarily by foreigners
    - lower public debt due to the bail-in
  - **❖** In Greece, a Bail-Out with the PSI delayed by 1.5 years
    - Greek debt unsustainable after Crisis-Phase II
- Domestic policy response: Very different
  - Program ownership in Cyprus, absent in Greece
  - Capacity to implement reforms in Cyprus, not so in Greece
  - Timely implementation of reforms in Cyprus
  - Package of fiscal measures were front-loaded in Cyprus
  - Cyprus exited the program in three years, Greece had a Phase II version of the crisis in 2015 just after its economy had picked up momentum and was ready to exit its MoU

#### III. Common risks today: Non-Performing loans



#### III. Common risks today: Investment too low



## IV. Concluding remarks on Cyprus: Is high long-term growth possible?

Cyprus can focus on its own growth recipe. One possibility would be to:

- 1. Safeguard macroeconomic stability and market credibility. Keep the fiscal budget balanced and ensure the pension system remains stable in the new era of low fertility rates. Macro stability may not be a sufficient condition for growth, yet it is necessary
- 2. Keep the political consensus on the geostrategic choice of EMU
- 3. Improve cost competitiveness, continue to reform and push the competitive advantages of the country. Besides low tax rates and specialized legal and accounting services, the country need to invest more in IT services
- 4. Improve the share of Investment in GDP. View the discovery of natural gas as a bonus
- 5. NPLs are 1.5 times the size of GDP. This is the biggest vulnerability of the country. Their resolution requires a delicate policy path, which will not disturb society, avoid a further collapse of asset prices and allow for their smooth recovery

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# Thank you for your attention!

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