

Overcoming the Crisis in Greece

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




Athens, November 11, 2013

FUTURE GROWTH MODEL, REQUIREMENT #1: EMPHASIS ON INVESTMENT & EXPORTS

2012 SHARE in nom. GDP	Greece	EA17
Private consumption	73.7%	57.5%
Public consumption	17.8%	21.5%
Total investment	13.2%	18.3%
Exports	27.0%	45.8%
Imports	32.0%	43.2%

Oil Exports in 2012 were € 10.4bn or 5.3% GDP
 Oil Imports in 2012 were € 17.9bn or 9.2% GDP



CONSUMPTION SHOULD GROW TOO, BUT AT A LOWER RATE

- ✓ **THE GROWTH MODEL:** In the future, consumption should grow at rates lower than investment & exports
- ✓ For recession to stop, mainly consumption has to stabilize, plus investment has to reverse its trend
- ✓ Private Consumption will stabilize if disposable income stabilizes, i.e. no more taxes, no drastic wage & pension cuts
- ✓ **The short and long-term growth paths are inter-linked:** If recession continues, all risks explode plus capital & labor inputs get destroyed, hurting future potential growth

	2012 Share in Nom. GDP	2013 growth Real	2014 growth Real
Private Consumption	73.7%	-7.1%	0.5%
Government Consumption	17.8%	-7.2%	-3.1%
Tot. Consumption	91.4%	-7.1%	-0.2%
GFCF	13.6%	-9.9%	1.5%
Domestic Demand	105.0%	-7.5%	0.0%
Imports	32.0%	-9.8%	0.6%
Exports	27.0%	2.9%	2.1%
GDP (nominal)	193.748		
Real GDP		-3.9%	0.4%
GDP deflator		-1.5%	-0.5%
Unemployment (avg)		27.6%	28.5%

RECOVERY GUARANTEED BY A NEW LOAN PACKAGE, YET DOWNSIDE RISKS AROUND



RECOVERY IN 2014: The best solution that guarantees recovery is another loan adequate to close the financing gap of 2014-2015

1. External Risks

- **Hardliners** emboldened by the Cypriot Bail-in Solution and by the balancing of the Greek current account (which minimizes contagion) ⇒ insist on **new fiscal** contractionary measures (instead of insisting on reforms) ⇒ new cuts in primary and secondary pensions in order to address expected fiscal shortfall (Gov.: €0.5-1.0bn, Troika: €2.0-2.5bn) ⇒ recession continues
- Although the market thinks otherwise, Debt **sustainability** remains an issue in the eyes of the IMF, which refuses credit. Yet, OSI is politically difficult prior to European Parliament elections in May 2014 ⇒ **Package solution** for debt sustainability & financing gap **delays** ⇒ resolution of uncertainty postponed ⇒ both liquidity and investment do not pick up momentum on time

2. Domestic Risks

- Government **raises taxes**, hence disposable income continues its earlier decline
- Government **fails** to design a **concrete growth model** ⇒ no anchor exists for expectations, sentiment stops improving, FDI does not arrive, etc.
- Population does **not see the greenshoots** ⇒ climate ↓ for investment & consumption
- **Ownership** of reforms has failed and now with primary surpluses, reforms stall as they touch the **DEEP STATE**, privatizations stall ⇒ toughening European stance

THE 2014 CENTRAL NEGOTIATING FEATURE: DSA – CONTINUOUS PRIMARY SURPLUS MATTERS


DSA – Sensitivity to primary surplus

	2012	2021	2030
Debt Baseline (€bn)	304.6	292.3	301.3
Nominal GDP - Baseline (€bn)	194.1	247.3	348.3
Debt Baseline (%GDP)	156.9	118.2	86.5
PS at 3% after 2015 (%GDP)	157.5	124.4	98.5
PS at 1.5% after 2014 (%GDP)	157.5	134.6	120.5
PS at 0% after 2013 (%GDP)	157.5	146.2	143.9

BASELINE ASSUMPTIONS

- Positive Growth from 2013 onwards with average growth at 2.3% of GDP for 2014-2030
- Primary Balance at 0.0% in 2013, 1.5% at 2014 3.0% at 2015 and on average 4.1% of GDP for 2016-2030

- ✓ Not only growth, but also primary surplus matters for debt sustainability
- ✓ Attaining a large primary surplus is not easy politically
- ✓ OSI could help as official holders, excluding the ECB, own €217bn



CAN WE SAY MORE ABOUT THE GROWTH MODEL?

- ✓ **There is a tendency**, especially among consultants who are pressed to give concrete advice, **to pick certain sectors of the economy on arguments of:**
 - comparative advantage (which is usually assumed to be obvious)
 - or large multipliers (without concrete estimation results)
 - or export importance of domestic value added,and claim those sectors ought to provide the basis for growth, e.g. tourism, agri-business, information technology, large infrastructure projects, energy, etc.
- ✓ **In choosing the sectors, one has to remember:**
 - The sector recipe advice tends to be similar for many countries, yet, no one says why is Greece different than, say, Croatia. (Answer: institutional & business environment)
 - Past sector performance does not guarantee future results, as world demand may shift in the future
 - Tourism is everyone's favorable sector in Greece and may indeed prove the counter-example: While it has silently shrank in importance over the last fifteen years, there is a loud anticipation that world demand for its services would rise over time
- ✓ **Supporting policies ought to shy away from subsidies and, instead, reward risk taking**
- ✓ **Another feature is the small size of enterprises across all sectors in Greece** ⇒
 - Need for policies that support consolidation and do not keep marginal enterprises artificially afloat
 - A large fraction of micro-enterprises in Greece survive because they cheat on taxes

ADDRESSING THE LONG-TERM: PROGRESS IN CERTAIN SOURCES OF GROWTH

- ❖ The country is addressing some of those factors with success, see Table in RHS:
- ❖ A more specific growth path is hard to pin point with precision as it depends on the evolution of both demand and supply factors (potential GDP). Nevertheless, we know:
 - **The procrastination of recession destroys labor skills and capital** and constrains growth over the next decade
 - **Lack of population growth or immigration abroad also reduces growth**

1. Competitiveness **improving**
2. Openness is **improving**: (Exports + Imports)/GDP from the 57.7% average over 2001-2009 is 59.0% in 2012
3. Inflation is **improving**: From 3.3% in 2001-2009 to 1.0% in 2012 (expected at -0.8% for 2013)
4. The size of government consumption is **declining**, from 18.4% in 2001-2009 to 17.8% in 2012
5. The initial condition will be **lower** at the end of 2014, which makes convergence easier

Relative Living Standards



EE-15=100 in PPS

1991	75.5	2003	80.7
1995	71.7	2007	80.9
1999	71.0	2014	65.4

	<u>Greece</u>	<u>EA-12</u>
1. <u>Investment</u> (% GDP)		
2001-2009	22.8	20.6
2012	13.1	18.4
2. <u>Corruption Perceptions Index</u>		
2012 (0-100)	36.0	70.6
3. <u>Rule of Law</u> 2011 (score -2,5 to 2,5)	0.57	1.41
4. <u>Government Effectiveness</u> 2011 (score -2,5 to 2,5)	0.48	1.36

Source: EUROSTAT, Transparency International, World Bank

5. Labor force participation and quality of education are also factors that lag behind



- ✓ **THE NEW GREEK GROWTH MODEL** requires a delicate balance between (i) a strong emphasis on exports & investment, and (ii) the requirement that consumption increases more modestly, i.e. at a lower rate than GDP, so that its share declines gradually to more normal levels without being a drag on domestic aggregate demand
- ✓ Two inter-related questions are pressing today:
 1. **When will the economy stop shrinking?** We expect in 2014
 2. **How will long-term equilibrium come back?** We are setting the ground for it
- ✓ The two questions are inter-linked because the sooner the recession/depression is over, the better the long-term prospects become, as
 - we need to reverse the trend of destruction in the factors of production, i.e. capital becoming obsolete, labor skills being destroyed, the youth immigrating, childbearing diminishing, etc.
 - Europeans ought to place an emphasis on Greek reforms and not so much on more drastic fiscal consolidation
 - Reforms have now touched the **DEEP STATE** and test government's willingness to proceed: OWNERSHIP OF REFORMS NEEDED
 - The reform recipe ought to go ahead even if recession continues

LET US NOT FORGET: Fixing our country is our problem and no one else's

**Thank you
for your attention**

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I wish to thank my colleagues at Eurobank for their comments